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CLAUDE PEPPER AND THE FLORIDA CANAL
CONTROVERSY, 1939-1943
by ALEXANDER R. STOESEN*
THE DREAM OF a waterway across Florida from the AtlanticOcean to the Gulf of Mexico long has captured the imagina-
tion. In 1595 Spanish cartographers depicted one across the
peninsula, a mistake assumed correct for nearly 200 years. Dur-
ing the British period in Florida, the royal government con-
ducted a survey to determine if such a route existed, and in
1788 the United States army produced a sketch map of the
area, although by that time it was clear no watercourse existed.
Later, Thomas Jefferson’s administration exhibited the first
high-level American interest in the construction of a water-
way— an interest which has continued to the present. Four sur-
veys were completed in the nineteenth century, including one
in 1832 while Florida was still a territory. All called for further
information and skirted the issue of actual construction of a
canal. The first twentieth-century study was made in 1913, a
second was completed in 1924— both noncommittal as to con-
struction. But in 1927 another survey was authorized, which has
been described as the beginning of “concrete efforts to complete
the 400-year-old dream.“1 This survey came during the tenure
of Florida Senator Duncan U. Fletcher, a long-time supporter
of the project.
In 1935, $5,000,000 in federal relief money put 6,000 men
to work on what Franklin D. Roosevelt hoped would “become
one of our greatest national achievements.“2 The result was a
year of desultory effort which produced a work camp, 4,000
acres of cleared right-of-way, 13,000,000 cubic feet of earth moved
by primitive methods, and the construction of four concrete
* Mr. Stoesen is associate professor of history at Guilford College, Greens-
boro, North Carolina.
1. Charles E. Bennett, “Early History of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal,”
Florida Historical Quarterly, XLV (October 1966), 144.
2. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Duncan U. Fletcher, September 23, 1935,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, PPF 1358.
[235]
1
Stoensen: Claude Pepper and the Florida Canal Controversy, 1939-1943
Published by STARS, 1971
236 FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
bridge piers.3 But in 1936 the President backed off and informed
Fletcher that after checking the figures, “it was really impos-
sible to go ahead with the canal project . . . under the Work
Relief Act of 1935.” He advised the senator to seek “direct
Congressional action.“4 Fletcher took the advice and secured
senate approval of a $10,000,000 appropriation, but it failed in
the house, June 17, 1936, on the very clay that Fletcher died.5
The start in 1935 was not a serious one by any stretch of
the imagination. The complex and expensive nature of the
project had precluded making it a relief measure. Roosevelt’s
support came partly from his interest in maritime affairs, but
there was also a note of deference to Fletcher. In 1933 the sena-
tor, as chairman of the senate banking and currency committee,
had rendered vital services to the New Deal when the financial
structure of the nation was being overhauled. Later Roosevelt
wrote Harry Hopkins saying that if the public works bill of
1936 did not include the canal, workers on the site should be
given “permanent, useful work” elsewhere.6 The President’s
caution, despite his apparent belief in the need for a canal,
seemed to indicate that he knew it could become a political
liability.
Fletcher had died at the age of seventy-seven, only six weeks
after the death of Park Trammell, Florida’s other senator. In
the political maneuvering that followed, Claude D. Pepper,
then a young Tallahassee attorney who had been defeated by
Trammell in 1934, emerged unopposed for Fletcher’s seat. The
other seat was won by Charles O. Andrews of Orlando, thus
preserving the tradition of having one senator from the northern
part of the state and the other from the southern.7
The canal had been a muted issue during the primaries and
general election of 1936, and Pepper was “clean” on one of the
most potentially dangerous issues in the state. One analysis held






Benjamin F. Rogers, “The Florida Ship Canal Project,” Florida His-
torical Quarterly, XXXVI (July 1957), 19.
Roosevelt to Fletcher, February 24, 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
PPF, 1358.
Rogers, “Florida Ship Canal Project,” 19.
Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, March 19, 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, OF 635.
Alexander R. Stoesen, “The Senatorial Career of Claude D. Pepper”
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1965), 28-54.
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another explained that Pepper’s potential opposition was
squelched by Jacksonville canal supporters and thus he was
able to come into office without having to take a stand.8 This
was vital to his political future since he would have to run
again in 1938. The state was divided. People in counties through
which the canal would pass favored it, thinking construction
would put money into depression-empty pockets. But residents
of south Florida, fearful of the damage it might do to their
water supply, fought it.
In the fall of 1936 the canal emerged from its grave, and
the controversy began anew when the army engineers reported
on November 1 that construction was feasible at a cost of $163,-
000,000.9 Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan claimed
the engineers’ report was “full of holes,” and he denounced the
project as being not only illogical but an “indefensible expen-
diture of public money.” As a senator who had fought it earlier
in the name of government economy, Vandenberg would con-
tinue to make this the chief issue in his battle against the
canal. In December, he vacationed in south Florida and found
the people “up in arms” against the “menace of the canal.“10
Pepper took high umbrage at Vandenberg’s remark and assured
him that he could leave to Florida’s senators “any questions
regarding the internal interests” of Florida.11
During 1937 Pepper remained silent on the canal even though
the engineers reaffirmed its feasibility at a higher price— $190,-
000,000, and the house rivers and harbors committee reported
a canal bill favorably. 12 The bill did not receive consideration
in the senate, which fitted Pepper’s political needs. The Demo-
cratic primary the next year pitted Pepper against four op-
ponents, including popular Miami Congressman Mark Wil-
cox and former Governor David Sholtz. Victory required Pep-
per to walk a political tight rope on the canal issue. In January
Pepper mentioned in Ocala, a canal town, that he favored
construction, a remark which the Miami Herald took to be a
“swat at the people of this end of the state” by a man who had
8. Orlando Sentinel, February 1, 1938.
9. House Documents, 75 Cong., 1st sess., No. 194, 149.
10. Miami Tribune, December 22, 1936.
11. Ocala Star, December 28, 1936.
12. House Document 194, 4; Congressional Record, 75 Cong., 1st sess., 5464.
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“cast his lot definitely with north Florida interests.“13 The
Tampa Tribune said, to its “regret,” that the young senator
had “sung his swan song in South Florida.“14 But by mid-
April, Pepper had so skillfully avoided an outright commit-
ment that a Fort Myers editor concluded: “It isn’t an issue.“15
The Herald, realizing an imminent Pepper victory, cautioned
that it would be a “sad day for Florida if New Dealism should
go down as the political movement that ruined the peninsula.“16
The 1938 primary proved to be Pepper’s most brilliant political
campaign; he defeated all four contenders without a run-off.
Although the canal had been avoided during the campaign,
Pepper was committed to it in his own mind. He believed it
had commercial and defense value, and relative to maritime
dimensions of the day, it was not beyond reason. Yet equally
important was the benefit he knew it would bring to the people
of Florida and the added prestige that would accrue to him if
he succeeded in obtaining it. The possibility of winning a
$200,000,000 project was something that could not be passed
over lightly, no matter how much the interests in one section
of the state might oppose it. Almost from his arrival in Wash-
ington he had worked with Henry H. Buckman, engineering
counsel to the Florida Ship Canal Authority, a semi-official body
formed in 1933 to push the proposal. In the summer of 1938
Buckman pointed out that Senator Royal S. Copeland of New
York, chairman of the commerce committee, and a “bitter, de-
termined, and effective opponent” of the canal, had died, and
“the attitude of the succeeding chairman” would be of “primary
interest to the canal.” Among Copeland’s possible successors
were Senators Morris Sheppard of Texas, Josiah Bailey of North
Carolina, and Bennett Clark of Missouri. Bailey was considered
the most likely to become chairman, and Pepper was advised to







Miami Herald, January 26, 1938.
Tampa Tribune, January 29, 1938.
Fort Myers News-Press, April 15, 1938.
Miami Herald, May 9, 1938.
Henry H. Buckman to Pepper, June 21, 1938, Claude Pepper Papers,
Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. Hereinafter referred to as
Pepper Papers; with the exception of the item cited in footnote 68, all
references are to the Pepper Papers located here.
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Fundamental differences existed between Bailey and Pepper
that were destined to boil over into open animosity as the 1939
session wore on. If the liberal and ardently pro-New Deal Pep-
per had an opposite number among southern Democrats in the
senate, it was Josiah Bailey. The senator from North Carolina
was one of the originators of the famous “Conservative Mani-
festo” of 1937, a New Dealer strictly on his own terms, and,
according to James T. Patterson in his study of congressional
conservatives of the New Deal era, the seventh most conserva-
tive Democrat in the senate .18 When Bailey became chairman
of the commerce committee in January 1939, there was little
Pepper could do to influence him, much less gain his friend-
ship. Despite the appointment of Lister Hill of Alabama and
James M. Mead of New York to the committee, both of whom
were sympathetic to the canal proposal, the real problem was
the conservatives’ economy-in-government forces led by Vanden-
berg and aided by Bailey who held the reins of power in the
committee.19
The 1939 session became the battleground for the ship canal.
Even before a bill was introduced in the senate, Vandenberg
attempted to create obstacles by calling for expert opinion on
the canal’s possible effect on the south Florida water supply and
its practical value to shipping interests.20 Pepper complained bit-
terly that this was interference in the affairs of his state, but
the resolutions were approved. 21 Vandenberg justified his action
by remarking that he had an interest of at least $10,000,000 in
the project— his estimate of Michigan’s share of the cost.22 Thus
the congressional conservatives turned the canal issue into a
clear-cut fight over federal spending and, in particular, over re-
lief projects. They did not need the ecology arguments that had
already begun to appear.
Pepper had no cause for alarm; the reports called for by
Vandenburg were highly favorable. The Bureau of Foreign and
18. John Robert Moore, “Senator Josiah W. Bailey and the Conservative
Manifesto of 1937,” Journal of Southern History, XXXI (February 1965),
20, 21; James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New
Deal:  The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939
(Lexington, 1967), 349.
19. Congressional Directory, 76 Cong., 1st sess., 178.
20. U.S. Senate, “Resolutions 63 and 64.” 76 Cong., 1st sess.
21. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 1st sess., 473.
22. Ibid.
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Domestic Commerce found that, “had it been open to traffic in
1937,” the canal would have created savings of $14,934,000 not
counting “indirect general benefits.”23 The geological survey
explained that construction would not have a generally adverse
effect on the peninsula as some thought it would. Moreover,
a lock canal would avoid water contamination altogether.24
One approach in gaining approval for the canal was to seek
presidential support. Pro-canal forces needed a statement from
Roosevelt affirming its virtues. The President responded to the
request by sending letters in mid-January 1939 to the chairman
of the senate commerce committee and the house rivers and
harbors committee, urging them to give “renewed attention” to
the canal. He observed that it was “justified by military and
commercial needs” and that the government could construct it
over a ten or fifteen year period “using as far as possible relief
labor.“25 The last point was probably a political error. Roose-
velt thus had played into the hands of the economy conserva-
tives when he could have left it purely a defense and commerce
measure.
Roosevelt’s letters did not ripple the waters of congress, but
created a wave of response in south Florida. A renewed drive
for the canal was “regarded as a betrayal of their interests by
south Floridians.“26 Individuals, civic groups, and garden clubs
flooded Pepper with letters and petitions expressing alarm over
the prospect of construction and demanded that he stop advo-
cating it.27 The Miami Herald, the most extreme anti-canal voice
in Florida, went on to say, “The argument that shipping . . .
needs a protected route is slightly more than goofy . . . [and]
the idea that the canal would have any military value is even
goofier. Ships wouldn’t trust it during the hurricane season and
could make better time in good weather going through the
straits of Florida.” Moreover, a sea level canal would require
a cut to a depth of 170 feet, thus destroying the underground
23. Senate Documents, 76 Cong., 1st sess., No. 35, 3.
24. Ibid., No. 37, 2, 3.
25. Roosevelt to Josiah W. Bailey, January 16, 1939, Pepper Papers.
26. Miami Herald, January 18, 1939.
27. See for example Carter Bradford (secretary, Winter Park Chamber of
Commerce) to Pepper, January 20, 1939; John L. Morris (general man-
ager, Miami Chamber of Commerce) to Pepper, January 20, 1939; Mrs.
E. E. DeKlyn (corresponding secretary, Miami Beach Garden Club) to
Pepper, January 18, 1939, Pepper Papers.
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water supply.28 Pepper, opposed by both the preservers of the
Florida water supply and the preservers of the national money
supply, refused to turn back. For him, 1939 was the best pos-
sible moment to seek canal legislation. To obtain the support
of south Floridians in the next election, he needed to prove both
the maximum time for the canal to be completed and its value
to the entire state.
A canal bill was introduced in the senate on February 1,
by Texas Senator Sheppard. In late March and early April the
commerce committee held six days of hearings on the bill.29
Buckman had urged Pepper to seek quick action in January,
preferably without a hearing, but with the growing power of
the conservatives this was out of the question.30 That the hear-
ings were completed in early April was something of an ac-
complishment for Pepper, but the speed with which they were
completed could be attributed instead to the desire by conserva-
tives to hurry the proposal through so it could be crushed in
the name of economy. On April 27, the Sheppard bill was re-
ported out of committee and placed on the calendar without
recommendation.31 Pepper claimed that this was a “great step
forward for the project . . . a victory for those supporting the
cause; it demonstrates the strength of sentiment behind it.”32
But the New York Times made the somber comment that no
recommendation meant “in essence the vote would be a test of
Senate sentiment on spending versus economy rather than a
vote on the canal itself.“33
Pepper knew he had to work from several angles. The best
way was to make the canal vital to national defense; another
was to demonstrate savings to the consumer. On May 11, in or-
der to convince his colleagues of the value of the project, he
held a “series of conferences suggestive of classroom lectures”
in the rear of the senate chamber. “On the wall, [and] suspended
from the railings of the galleries was a series of maps showing
the relative commercial and defensive features of the proposed
28. Miami Herald, January 18, 1939.
29. U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Florida Ship Canal, Hearings
on S. 1100, 76 Cong., 1st sess.
30. Buckman to Pepper, November 12, 1938, Pepper Papers.
31. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 1st sess., 4819.
32. Pepper “Press Release,” April 27, 1939, Pepper Papers.
33. New York Times, May 18, 1939.
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canal, compared with similar works at Panama and Suez.“34
This was an unusual thing for a senator to do, but Pepper got
away with it because he was generally well liked and had in-
gratiated himself with the leadership.
The most difficult angle was to turn the canal vote into a
party issue. Pepper worked to line up support. In mid-March
he took a delegation of twelve senators headed by Majority
Leader Alben W. Barkley to Florida. At Ocala he hinted that
the Kentuckian might make a good Democratic nominee in
1940. Taking high umbrage at this, the Miami Herald called
Pepper “the high priest of the canal coterie” who had “pontif-
icated at the anointing of the Barkley” for 1940. The Herald
doubted Barkley’s qualifications and denounced him for saying
he was “not only down here to inspect the canal but to build
it. ”35 After the senatorial junket Pepper sought President
Roosevelt’s support for the trouble-ridden house version of the
bill. He did not want to miss the “decisive impetus” the Presi-
dent could give it.36 But it is probable that any impetus from the
White House would have assured the death of the project,
since congressional conservatism was not limited to the senate.
Roosevelt did nothing.
Pepper’s effort to make the canal a party issue was designed
to divide the conservatives, who had turned the 1939 session
into the “Zenith of Coalition.“37 In this, Vandenberg’s opposi-
tion and his dabbling in the affairs of the South could be help-
ful. The Washington correspondent of the anti-canal Miami
Herald was impressed by Pepper’s energy and drive:
Seldom does a Senator work as Pepper has done for the canal.
There was no statesmanlike reserve about him as he dug in
from the White House down to put over this development.
He pulled every string he could. There was something re-
freshing about the way Pepper battled. It reminds one of
Old Bob LaFollette and the way he fought for everything
he could lay his hands on . . . . The energetic Florida Sena-
tor would make no predictions about the canal vote in the
Senate. He had a check on every colleague. All he said was
“I hope.“38
34. Ibid., May 12, 1939.
35. Miami Herald, March 14, 1939.
36. Pepper to Roosevelt, March 17, 1939, Pepper Papers.
37. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 288-324.
38. See Radford Mobley’s column, Miami Herald, May 14, 1939.
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But in the end hope was not enough. The Florida ship canal
was a project on which few senators were willing to compromise
their opinions, since it was seen as a spending program. As
most senators “had made up their minds on the canal project”
there was little Pepper could do to sway them.39
On May 12, Senator Sheppard led off debate with a three-
hour speech that covered every possible aspect of the proposal.
He concluded: “It is my belief that no project has ever come
before Congress more thoroughly considered by expert and of-
ficial reviewing authority, more logically justified or more re-
plete with benefit to the American people.“40 Several days later,
Senator Vandenberg got to the heart of the matter, the cost
of the canal. The point at issue was not the canal itself, but
economy. Vandenberg said it was his “prayerful hope that the
tax resources of seventy-five per cent of the American people
will not be dissipated by the Senate of the United States” in
this manner.41 He had another source of enormous leverage
although never stated, which was that $200,000,000 was more
than most senators, liberal or conservative, Democrat or Repub-
lican, northern or southern, were willing to authorize for a
single project in any state. It was reported that “at no time
in current memory has the Senate undertaken consideration of
a costlier measure involved in a shorter bill.“42
Pepper, who must have been aware of this trend of senti-
ment, spoke only briefly. A great admirer of Senator Fletcher,
he gave him tribute and referred to the canal as “the great
dream that throbbed” in his predecessor’s breast. Pepper made
a series of broad concessions on the means of financing the proj-
ect, aimed at making it self-amortizing through the collection
of tolls, and he concluded by appealing to the “fair-minded-
ness . . . sound judgment . . . good sense . . . and patriotism”
of his colleagues.43
When the vote was taken before filled galleries on May 17,
Pepper was defeated. This was his first effort to obtain a major
piece of legislation, and he had thought it had a chance; defeat
was a bitter disappointment. The bill lost by a forty-six to
39. New York Times, May 17, 1939.
40. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 1st sess., 5502.
41. Ibid., 5586.
42. New York Times, May 17, 1939.
43. Congessional Record, 76 Cong., 1st sess., 5606.
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thirty-six vote, and Pepper’s effort to turn it into a party issue
had failed. Of those voting “nay” twenty-three were Democrats,
seventeen of whom were considered conservatives.44 Pepper had
managed to wean only three conservative Democrats from the
coalition, and two, Tom Connally of Texas and Richard Rus-
sell of Georgia, were from states which would benefit from the
canal. If the seven paired were added to the thirty-six “ayes”
on the roll call the total would have been forty-three, only three
short of the forty-six Pepper had claimed earlier. But no amount
of figuring could change the margin of defeat. Pepper told a
Miami Beach constituent that he had “always been at a loss
to understand the bitterness with which you and certain others
. . . have approached this subject.” He said that his “course” in
public life would continue to be to use his “best judgment” to
work for “those things which I believe to be for the best interest
of our State and Country.“45
In a sense it was a classic example of the conservatives at
work. In the long list of roll call votes on New Deal proposals,
the bills always had included items that made conservatives as
well as liberals jump from one side to the other, but this was
a significant test of economy sentiment “freed of the usual con-
siderations in legislation involving group interest.“46 It gener-
ally was viewed as a strong victory for opponents of the adminis-
tration and a “feather in the hat of Vandenberg.“47  in
examining the significant roll call votes of 1937, 1938, and 1939,
the ship canal vote offers a distinct roster of the so-called coali-
tion. It coincides almost to a man with James Patterson’s list
of the obstructionist group of conservatives.48 For once they
could line up in opposition to a single issue without fear of
group interests or dissent at home. Even so, it was to be a mean-
ingless victory in the effort to hold back the tide of spending.
As the session moved into summer, Pepper’s anger over the
inactivity of congress increased. The loss of the ship canal added
to his bitterness. In the waning moments of the session, on
August 5, 1939, despite several efforts to stop him, he obtained
the floor. He was “unwilling,” he said, to go home without
44. Ibid., 5649.
45. Pepper to Agnes Parnell, May 25, 1939, Pepper Papers.
46. New York Times, May 17, 1939.
47. Ibid., May 18, 1939.
48. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 349.
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lifting his voice “to decry the unrighteous partnership of those
who have been willing to scuttle the American government . . .
because they hate Roosevelt and what Roosevelt stands for.”
He continued:
I accuse that willful alliance of a designed attempt to with-
hold aid and a meager succor from the unemployed and
aged . . . .
I accuse that designing alliance of a deliberate attempt to
sabotage the first real effort . . . to secure . . . industrial
democracy and economic emancipation.
I accuse them of having prostituted their power to serve the
United States Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturer’s
Association, and the beneficiaries of special privileges . . . .
As his accusations mounted Pepper was stopped, and a roll call
vote was taken on the question of allowing him to continue.
His right was affirmed, thirty-four to fifteen, and, amid the jeers
and taunts, the j’accuse speech continued.
The “alliance” was accused of intriguing to strike down
the Fair Labor Standards Act, “giving aid and comfort to the
enemy, ” “deceiving the American people,” crucifying the lend-
ing program, and a host of other charges. He concluded they
had “sacrificed humanity and human value to reaction, prop-
erty and Hooverism.” Through the rumble this caused in the
chamber the voice of Senator Bailey could be heard asking if it
would be in order to characterize Pepper’s remarks as “cowardly
and mendacious.” Then, to the relief of the leadership, the
messenger from the house arrived with news of agreement to
adj ourn.49
Pepper’s speech has been described as a “fitting climax to
a stormy session, and a liberal dose of acid on the already
frayed bonds tying together the Democratic Party.“50 On some
issues the Democrats had voted the party line, but on others
a hard core of conservatives had voted with twenty-one senate
Republicans who usually held together. The conservatives as
a group never had a consistent ideology despite the efforts of
Senator Bailey, but the ship canal vote was an example of why
some liberals such as Pepper thought of the conservatives as
49. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 1st sess., 11165, 11168.
50. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 326.
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a well-organized conspiratorial coalition. A leading authority
on the conservatives has observed that “Pepper was right about
conservative success,” but that for a variety of reasons he was
wrong in the idea that a conspiracy existed.51
After May 1939, the idea of a ship canal, if not dead, was in
its death throes. Never again would this grandiose scheme be
brought to congress. But Pepper was not yet ready to give up.
Shortly after the defeat of the canal bill, he had offered a
resolution to have the interoceanic canals committee study
means by which the federal government could “finance or parti-
cipate in the financing of” the canal.52 Henry H. Buckman,
who was given to sending Pepper long memoranda, advised
“that we take this one step at a time, and that we do not divulge
our entire plan, especially the political phases, until after the
approval of the resolution.” Important to Buckman was a care-
ful approach to certain key senators on the commerce commit-
tee, especially Carl Hayden of Arizona and Bennett Clark of
Missouri. Buckman also thought it would be possible to de-
monstrate the “self-liquidating” nature of the project and to
have the ship canal authority issue bonds on which the interest
would be guaranteed by the federal government.53 However, the
first step of getting the resolution favorably reported out of
committee by January 15, 1940, never took place. Pepper then
obtained the signatures of “about thirty Senators to a letter to
the President requesting the appointment of a board” to study
the defense aspects of the project.54 Even though Pepper’s star
was rising in Democratic party councils, the President did not
act on the request.
The Florida senator was mentioned as a vice-presidential
possibility that year, and at the Democratic convention he made
a seconding speech for Roosevelt, which the President said was
“like a refreshing breeze.“55 This caused one editor to hope the
young senator had “not been so blinded by the national spot-
light . . . that he can’t see that this is the strategic and propi-
tious time for the canal issue to be brought up.”56 Pepper as-
51.  Ibid., 327.
52. U.S. Senate, 76 Cong., 1st sess., “Resolution 145.”
53. Buckman to Pepper, June 21, 1939, Pepper Papers.
54. Pepper to executive committee of the canal district counties, August
28, 1940, Pepper Papers.
55. Roosevelt to Pepper, August 3, 1940, Pepper Papers.
56. Jacksonville Journal, August 21, 1940.
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Claude Pepper’s 1938 campaign for the United States Senate against
Governor David Sholtz and Congressman Mark Wilcox of Miami. Pepper
is pictured speaking at Bartow. (Time magazine cover, May 2, 1938).
Pepper in the U. S. Senate in May 1941. (Time May 19, 1941).
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sured canal supporters: “I have always been for the Canal, I
am for it, and I shall continue to be for it, because I think it
of vital importance to the country’s commerce and safety.” He
urged patience and reliance on his “ability and judgment” in
the “arduous, tedious” work of canal legislation. Nothing
seemed to be happening, but he spent a “great deal of time
upon one detail or another . . . every week if not every day”
in working for it, and a major speech was in the offing as soon
as he thought the “occasion appropriate.“57 The appropriate
occasion did not arise. When Harold Stassen made a deroga-
tory remark about it in his keynote speech at the Republican
national convention, Pepper wrote Roosevelt that if he did
“not want to do anything about the canal until after the elec-
tion, I shall not bring up the matter again.“58
The idea that the canal was vital to defense was probably
the most valid reason for its construction. Had the canal been
ready when the war began, it could have eased wartime trans-
portation problems. Pepper deserves credit for his foresight in
trying to obtain it in 1939, but the project remained in limbo
as the war began. It was not until March 1942, that Pepper
found the appropriate occasion to broach the subject again.
He quoted a letter from Major General Edward M. Markham,
former chief of United States army engineers, who could not
understand why “so many people in Congress have never been
willing to regard the canal on its own merits.” Pepper’s sights
by this time had been lowered to a barge canal, and he offered
a bill to complete one at the “earliest possible time” prior to
which a pipeline would be laid along the route of the proposed
canal.59 The bill languished in the commerce committee in spite
of Pepper’s efforts to get it out. He sought to make it clear that
it was not the old ship canal bill, adding that responsibility
for wartime oil shortages would “not rest upon the shoulders
of those who tried to secure . . . the Florida Ship Canal.” Nor
were they responsible for the deaths of seamen in German sub-
marine attacks on coastwise shipping.60 The argument of war-
time transportation problems finally brought senate approval of
57. Pepper to executive committee of the canal district counties, August
28, 1940, Pepper Papers.
58.
59.
Pepper to Marguerite le Hand, August 19, 1940, Pepper Papers.
Congressional Record, 77 Cong., 2nd sess., 3249.
60. Ibid.
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a house version of the barge canal bill omitting the pipeline
in July 1942. Roosevelt signed the authorizing act on July 23
for a project Pepper had already said was “too little, too late.“61
The question legitimately might be asked as to whether
Pepper’s effort to obtain a wartime start on canal construction
was both as hopeless and useless as he apparently felt it was.
The basic issue was the matter of time. Only if it could be
finished in time to make a significant contribution to the war
effort would it be worth any diversion of men and material. Few
questioned the value of such a contribution; however, as the
submarine menace lessened, the need for a canal lessened. Pep-
per, in seeking to overcome the time factor, once obtained an
estimated minimum construction time of fifteen months from
the chief of engineers, who quickly added that three years was
a more realistic figure. But Senator Bailey pointed out that the
real need was for “something in operation in the next six
months.“62
The need Bailey noted was being met by pipelines built
under the direction of Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes who
was also wartime petroleum administrator. Ickes pressed pipe-
line construction with his customary efficiency, and he objected
to the canal on ecological and practical grounds. He did not
think it could be dug in a short time, and he opposed the
diversion of resources it would require. In 1943 Pepper struck
back by denouncing a bill for additional pipeline construction
in the hope of thwarting what he called Ickes’s “Messianic mis-
sion . . . to build pipelines everywhere he can.” He added that
the secretary was “intellectually dishonest” for holding back
information about water transportation of oil. If left to his
own means, Ickes would “build a pipe line anywhere in the
United States that the dictates of his cupidity, fancy, or folly
may lead him.“63 Senator Burton K. Wheeler assured Pepper
that Ickes was honest and able, and Ickes complained to Pep-
per about the cupidity remark, pointing out that in opposing
the canal he had the Florida water supply in mind as well as
Pepper’s political future. Pepper, he said, might well consider
61. Ibid., 6290; U.S. Statutes at Large, LVI, part 1, 703.
62. U. S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, 77 Cong., 2nd sess., Construction
and Operation of  Pipeline and Navigable Barge Channel Across
Florida, Hearings on S. 2426 and HR. 6999, 55 ff.
63. Congressional Record, 78 Cong., 1st sess., 6727-28.
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any opposition to the canal a “favor,” since it could prove his
political grave.64
The canal issue usually generated bitterness and sarcasm.
Senator Francis T. Maloney of Connecticut thought it an “in-
credibly inefficient” means of transportation and from any
point of view or period of time a “wasteful project.“65 Senator
Tom Connally said of Pepper, “I have been under the spell of his
magic,” and called for language in intracoastal waterways bills
that would preclude the chance of Pepper’s using his “eloquence
and persuasiveness” on the engineers.66 Vandenburg conceded
“great respect” for Pepper’s “incorrigible tenacity” in fighting for
the canal and for never having deviated from his objective “re-
gardless of setbacks and obstacles . . . the Treasury’s anemia or
the council of prudence and common sense.” The use of the
wartime transportation crisis to win authorization in 1942 was
to Vandenberg a “most delightfully insidious approach.” The
Michigan senator took comfort in assurances from the engineers
that nothing would be started during the war.67
Time was of the essence. In 1943 Pepper made a last effort
to obtain a barge canal appropriation, but the appropriations
committee failed to approve it, seventeen to fourteen. Bitterly,
Pepper wrote to his parents that “defeat was due to southern
senators who voted against their own south— McKeller of Ten-
nessee, Russell of Georgia, and Overton of Louisiana.“68 After
1943 Pepper never brought up the subject again. The project
was simply not in the realm of merit during the war, and with-
out the problems created by the war it had little chance of
success in the postwar era. Pepper’s interests turned to foreign
affairs and domestic problems. Over the years he fell out of
favor with his constituency, and he was defeated in the Florida
Democratic primary of 1950.
In 1962, after a dozen years in private life, Pepper was
elected to the house of representatives, returning to a congress
in which the old opponents of the canal were gone. In Feb-
ruary 1964, he was present at the ceremonies which marked the
64. Ibid., Harold L. Ickes to Pepper, July 22, 1943, Pepper Papers.
65. Congressional Record, 78 Cong., 1st sess., 4054.
66. Congressional Record, 77 Cong., 2nd sess., 8361.
67.  Ibid., 8425.
68. Pepper to his parents, May 5, 1943, in Pepper Papers, Tallahassee,
Florida.
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start of construction on a barge canal. Pepper had outlasted
them all, and it must have been with a certain degree of satis-
faction that he watched President Lyndon Johnson set off a
dynamite blast.69 It seemed as if the dream was about to come
true.
But to some the dream was a nightmare. Political rivalries
and money had never been the whole issue. Pepper’s files con-
tain dozens of letters and reports in which opposition was based
on ecological considerations. The argument against the canal
which came to the fore in the late sixties and early 1970s is
nothing new, but it emerged just when it seemed as if the
major battle was won by the pro-canal forces. The canal proj-
ect became a timely subject in the battle to save the environ-
ment. It has been described as “an antiquated concept . . .
being done in an antiquated way,” which will “raise havoc
with the ecology of Florida.“70 It has also been called an
“octopus,” having the army “Engineers . . . self-serving politi-
cians . . . special interests . . . and . . . state agencies” as its
tentacles.71 One study which combines the ecological argument
with economic analysis charges the engineers with dishonesty
and concludes that in addition to bringing ecological disaster,
the canal is “likely to be . . . an economic disaster for the U. S.
taxpayers.“72 All the old questions have come back for answers,
but with a new sense of urgency.
In the summer of 1970, Secretary of the Interior Walter J.
Hickle proposed a fifteen-month construction moratorium, and
on January 15, 1971, a United States District Court judge in
Washington issued a preliminary injunction halting construc-
tion temporarily in the hope of “preserving the environment”
and preventing “irrevocable” damage to the Oklawaha River.73
Four days later an order from President Nixon halted all con-
struction on the canal to “prevent a past mistake from causing
permanent damage.“74 Construction has been stopped and the
old dream may remain a dream. The new dream is the preserva-
69. New York Times, February 28, 1964; White House “Press Release,”
70.
February 27, 1964.
San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, June 14, 1970.
71. Atlantic, Vol. 225, (April 1970), 59.
72. David W. Ehrenfeld, Biological Conservation (New York, 1970) 87.
73. Greensboro Daily News, July I, 1970; New York Times, January 16,
1971.
74. Ibid., January 20, 1971.
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tion of the Oklawaha River Valley in its natural state, and the
conservative opposition to the canal has given way to the con-
servationist opposition.
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